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Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers unconditional security against eavesdropping [1], but
state-of-the-art secret key rates (SKRs) for QKD are only ∼1 Mbps on a 50-km-long fiber link [2],
i.e., orders of magnitude lower than classical fiber-communication rates. Floodlight QKD (FL-
QKD) is a Gaussian two-way quantum key distribution protocol (TW-QKD) that is theorized to
be capable of Gbps SKRs over metropolitan-area distances [3]. In FL-QKD, Alice sends quantum
states to Bob. While they estimate the correlation between eavesdropper Eve and Bob, Bob encodes
a raw key on the light he receives and sends that modulated light back to Alice. Unfortunately,
until now FL-QKD’s security proof is limited to frequency-domain collective attacks [3]. More
generally, the security of TW-QKD against coherent attacks is still an open problem.
In this paper, we use the noisy entanglement-assisted capacity [4] to create a coherent-
attack security framework for Gaussian TW-QKD protocols in the asymptotic region. We use
Eve’s disturbance of Alice and Bob’s Gaussian-state covariance matrix—which can be bounded
from homodyne measurements—to quantify her intrusion on a Gaussian TW-QKD protocol,
such as those in Refs. [3, 5], and obtain therefrom unconditional security against a coher-
ent attack. Our results pave the way towards high-rate QKD with unconditional security.
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FIG. 1. Single-use schematic of a
Gaussian TW-QKD protocol.
Gaussian TW-QKD protocols.— Figure. 1 shows a single
use of a general Gaussian TW-QKD protocol. Alice prepares
a signal-reference pair (Y,W ) in a two-mode squeezed vacuum
(TMSV) state with mean photon number NS . She measures
a portion of W for security checking, and sends the signal Y
to Bob through a forward channel that is controlled by Eve.
In general, Eve performs a unitary operation on Y and her
pure-state input V , retaining its E output and delivering its
signal output S to Bob. (Note that V and E can have multiple
modes per channel use.) In Eve’s coherent attack, her unitary
operation can act jointly on all channel uses [6].
Figure 2 contains a schematic plot of the protocol after Bob receives S. He measures a portion of
S for security checking, and encodes a random symbol x on the remainder. Alice and Bob’s security
checking uses homodyne measurements [7, 8] to estimate constraints on the covariance matrix of
the joint state ρˆSW ; in the asymptotic regime these estimates will be perfect. Bob encodes x
with a unitary Uˆx composed of a phase shift θx and a displacement dx that are easily realized
with linear optics. Conditioned on the message x, the encoded mode has annihilation operator
aˆ
′(x)
S = e
iθx aˆS + dx. The dx’s are assumed to be zero-mean Gaussian random variables, implying
that encoding on a vacuum state will average to produce a thermal state. The encoding scheme is
symmetric, i.e.,
∑
x PX (x) e
iθxdx = 0, and energy constrained, viz., EX =
∑
x PX (x) |dx|2. Thus
it includes the random-displacement encoding scheme used in Refs. [5, 9] and the phase encoding
employed in FL-QKD [3, 10]. The unconditional state of (S′,W ) is non-Gaussian in general.
Bob’s encoded signal passes through channel Ψ that models the part of the return channel that
is not under Eve’s control, e.g., loss in Bob’s terminal, but we will allow Ψ to be any Gaussian
channel without excess noise: a pure-loss channel (transmissivity η), a quantum-limited amplifier
(gain GB), or a quantum-limited phase conjugator (gain GB). After Ψ, Bob sends its output B to
Alice through a channel controlled by Eve. Alice jointly measures the light she receives with part
of W to obtain a raw key from which the secret key will be distilled after Alice and Bob use their
covariance-matrix constraints to bound the information gained by Eve.
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2Bounding eavesdropper’s information gain.— In the asymptotic regime, a QKD protocol’s
secret-key efficiency (SKE), in bits per channel use, against a coherent attack is given by
the Devetak-Winter formula [6, 11] SKE = max [ξIAB − IE , 0], where IAB is Alice and Bob’s
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FIG. 2. Gaussian TW-QKD protocol
from Eve’s perspective.
Shannon information in bits per channel use, ξ is their recon-
ciliation efficiency, and IE is Eve’s Holevo-information gain in
bits per channel use. (Note that Alice and Bob’s SKR equals
R SKE, where R is Bob’s symbol rate.) The maximization
in the Devetak-Winter formula needs to be performed over
all possible attacks that pass the security checking measure-
ments, i.e., that are consistent with Alice and Bob’s measured
covariance-matrix constraints. We will perform that maxi-
mization on χE ≡ IE/ME , Eve’s Holevo information in bits
per mode, where ME is the number of modes used per en-
coded symbol. Thus, because ξIAB can be inferred from Alice and Bob’s reconciliation step, the
asymptotic security proof of the TW-QKD protocols rests on putting an upper bound on χE .
Bounding χE for a TW-QKD protocol is complicated by Eve’s simultaneously attacking the
forward and backward channels [3, 5, 9, 12–14]. Consequently, the usual techniques, such as
the entropic uncertainty principle [15], are not applicable here because of loss. Recognizing that
the TW-QKD protocol shown in Fig. 2 can be regarded as noisy entanglement-assisted classi-
cal communication from Bob to Eve, we use the noisy entanglement-assisted classical capac-
ity formula [4] to place on upper bound on χE . Thus we establish a new security framework
for TW-QKD protocols. Consider a multiple channel uses QKD session over M mode pairs.
We use the same notation as Fig. 1 with subscripts indicating the different mode pairs, i.e.,
S = S1S2 · · ·SM , W = W1W2 · · ·WM , and B = B1B2 · · ·BM . For Gaussian protocols, the Uˆx’s are
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(b) FL-QKD protocol. GB =
106, NS is optimized.
FIG. 3. Secret-key rates versus path length L.
covariant with Ψ, thus Eve’s informa-
tion gain is upper bounded by a maxi-
mization, given the covariance-matrix con-
straints, over multiple mode pairs, i.e., the
multi-letter formula [4],
χ
(M)
E = maxρˆSW
F [ρˆSW] , with (1)
F [ρˆSW] ≡ S (ρˆB)− E(Ψ⊗M )c⊗I [ρˆSW] , (2)
where each ρˆBm =
∑
x PX (x) Ψ[Uˆ
†
xρˆSmUˆ
†
x],
i.e., we have assumed independent encod-
ing on each mode pair. With dependent en-
coding, Eq. (1) is still an upper bound. A
trace-preserving completely-positive map φ
has complementary channel we denote as φc, and the entropy gain of φ on state ρˆ is Eφ [ρˆ] ≡
S (φ [ρˆ])−S (ρˆ). To reduce Eq. (1) to a single mode-pair (single-letter) formula, we use the subad-
ditivity of F [ρˆSW] [4], and, because Ψ is a Gaussian channel, this also ensures that the maximum
of Eq. (1) is achieved by a Gaussian-state ρˆSW [4] under the given covariance-matrix constraints.
At this point we introduce the covariance-matrix constraints that Alice and Bob will ob-
tain from their security checking. The first will be the total mean photon number of the sig-
nal received by Bob,
∑M
n=1 〈aˆ†Sn aˆSn〉 = MκSNS . The second will be the total cross correla-
tion between Alice’s retained and Bob’s received modes,
∑M
m,n=1(| 〈aˆSm aˆWn〉 |2 + | 〈aˆSm aˆ†Wn〉 |2) =
(1− fE)κSMNS (NS + 1). Here, fE , κS quantify Eve’s intrusion on the quantum channels, and
0 ≤ fE ≤ 1, required by physics. By constraining the covariance matrix we can bound χE , because
χE decreases with increasing κS and it increases with increasing fE . The total mean photon number
constrains the covariance matrix’s diagonal elements, while
∑M
m,n=1(| 〈aˆSm aˆWn〉 |2+| 〈aˆSm aˆ†Wn〉 |2) ≥
|∑Mn=1 〈aˆSn aˆWn〉 |2 + |∑Mn=1 〈aˆSn aˆ†Wn〉 |2 implies that the covariance matrix’s off-diagonal elements
give a lower bound on the total correlation.
3By using optimization techniques similar to those in Ref. [3], we can show that our constraints
permit Eq. (1) to be reduced to a single-letter formula that can be evaluated as a function of the
intrusion parameters κS , fE . With Eve’s information gain in hand, the SKE can then be obtained
from the Devetak-Winter formula. In the examples that follow, we will use κS equal to the one-way
fiber loss κS = 10
−0.02L that Alice and Bob will see when they are connected by L km of fiber.
TMSV protocol with random displacement [5, 9].— In this protocol, Alice has access to the full
TMSV, Bob encodes each mode using random displacements with power EX , and Ψ is the noiseless
identity channel. Figure 3(a) compares our SKE lower bound with the SKE result from Refs. [5, 9]
when fE = 0, ξ = 1 and EX  1, NS  1. Our lower bound, which applies for a coherent attack
in the asymptotic regime, is much lower than the one from Refs. [5, 9], which only applies for
a special class of collective attacks. We believe that much of this gap is due to our giving Eve
all the light on the backward channel, which is an overly conservative assumption given the short
distances involved, e.g., κS = 0.63 for L = 10 km. For TW-QKD protocols like FL-QKD, which are
capable of long-distance operation, we expect that our SKE lower bound will be tighter at those
long distances, e.g., when κS = 0.1 for L = 50 km.
FL-QKD protocol [3, 10, 16].— FL-QKD offers Gbps SKRs at long distances by virtue of three
features. First, Alice uses low-brightness amplified spontaneous emission light (ASE), together
with TMSV light, in her transmission to Bob, while retaining a high-brightness ASE reference as a
homodyne-detection local oscillator for measuring Bob’s encoded message. Nevertheless, even with
only partial access to the purification W , Alice can still establish asymptotic security. Second, Bob
uses a high-gain (GB  1) amplifier as his Ψ, which overcomes the backward-channel loss issue that
plagues previous TW-QKD protocols [5, 9]. Finally, Bob uses multi-mode encoding, ME  1, that
allows Alice to decode Bob’s message despite the low-brightness of the signal light she transmitted.
Previous work [3, 10, 16] has only proven Fl-QKD’s security against a frequency-domain collective
attack. Here we apply our framework to obtain its asymptotic SKE against a coherent attack.
FL-QKD, uses phase encoding, so its EX = 0. Although alphabets larger than binary are
known to be beneficial [10], here we will consider binary encoding with phases θ0 = 0, θ1 = pi
representing the bit values 0 and 1. Figure 3(b) plots FL-QKD’s SKE against a coherent attack in
the asymptotic regime assuming fE = 0, ξ = 1 for a variety of ME values where we have optimized
over the source brightness at each distance. The red line corresponds to the operating point of
ME = 200 as used in Refs. [3, 10] for the frequency-domain collective attack. We see that with
ME  1 and R = 10 Gbps, FL-QKD provides Gbps SKRs at long distances. Note that FL-
QKD’s SKE against the coherent attack—as determined here—coincides with the SKE obtained in
Ref. [3] against the frequency-domain collective attack, and hence the SKE incurred with fE > 0
for a coherent attack can be found from that reference.
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